

1. (3 points) A student has a quiz in his math class. He can study hard for the quiz, study a bit for the quiz or not study at all. The quiz can be challenging, moderate or easy. The student assigns a "satisfaction value" to each of the outcomes as shown in the matrix below:

| | challenging | moderate | easy |
|----------------|-------------|----------|----------|
| study hard | 5 | 3 | <u>2</u> |
| study a little | 2 | 4 | <u>1</u> |
| don't study | <u>-1</u> | 1 | 0 |

a) What should the student do if he is an optimist?

study hard (and expect a challenging quiz)

b) What should the student do if he is a pessimist?

study hard (and expect a challenging quiz)

c) What is the expected value of studying a little if there is a 25% chance of a challenging quiz, 50% chance of a moderate quiz and 25% chance of an easy quiz?

$$E = 2(.25) + 4(.5) + 1(.25) = 2.75$$

2. (1 point) Remove any dominated strategies from the matrix

| | | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 2 | 3 | 1 | 5 |
| 6 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| 1 | -4 | 0 | 3 |

| | | |
|----|---|---|
| 5 | 4 | 1 |
| -4 | 0 | 3 |

3. (1 point) Bill and Sue play a game with coins. Both flip a coin at the same time. If both coins show heads or both coins show tails, Bill wins \$2 from Sue. If one coin shows heads and one shows tails, Sue wins \$2 from Bill. Construct the payoff matrix for this game.

| | | | |
|------|---|-----|----|
| | | Sue | |
| | | H | T |
| Bill | H | 2 | -2 |
| | T | -2 | 2 |

or

| | | | |
|-----|---|------|----|
| | | Bill | |
| | | H | T |
| Sue | H | -2 | 2 |
| | T | 2 | -2 |

4. (2 points) Using the payoff matrix below for a two-person zero-sum game, find the saddle point, the optimal strategy for the row player and the value of the game. Is the game fair? If not, why not?

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & -4 & 5 \\ -2 & 0 & -1 \\ 4 & 1 & 1 \\ -1 & -2 & -4 \end{pmatrix}$$

Saddle @ row 3 and col 2
 row player plays row 3 all the time
 value of the game is 1
 Not fair as it favors 1

5. (3 points) Given the payoff matrix $M = \begin{pmatrix} 2 & -3 \\ -5 & 6 \end{pmatrix}$,

- (a) What is the value of this game if the row player plays row 1 20% of the time and the column player plays column 1 70% of the time?
- (b) What is the row player's optimum strategy?
- (c) What is the value of the game if each player plays their optimum strategy?

(a) $(.2 \ .8) \begin{bmatrix} 2 & -3 \\ -5 & 6 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} .7 \\ .3 \end{bmatrix} = [-1.26]$

value is -1.26

(b) $q_1 = \frac{6 - (-5)}{2 + 6 - (-3) - (-5)} = \frac{11}{16} = .6875$

$q_2 = 1 - q_1 = \frac{5}{16} = .3125$

Play row 1 .6875 of the time and row 2 .3125 of the time.

(c) $q_1 = \frac{6 - (-3)}{2 + 6 - (-3) - (-5)} = \frac{9}{16} = .5625$

$q_2 = 1 - q_1 = \frac{7}{16} = .4375$

$E = (.6875 \ .3125) \begin{pmatrix} 2 & -3 \\ -5 & 6 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} .5625 \\ .4375 \end{pmatrix} = (-.1875)$

$p_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{21}}{a_{11} + a_{22} - a_{12} - a_{21}}$ ~~and $p_2 = 1 - p_1$~~

$q_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{12}}{a_{11} + a_{22} - a_{12} - a_{21}}$ ~~and $q_2 = 1 - q_1$~~