Events for 09/05/2016 from all calendars
Probability Seminar
Time: 3:00PM - 4:00PM
Location: BLOC 628
Speaker: Eviatar B. Procaccia, TAMU
Title: Opting Into Optimal Matchings
Abstract: We revisit the problem of designing optimal, individually rational matching mechanisms (in a general sense, allowing for cycles in directed graphs), where each player — who is associated with a subset of vertices — matches as many of his own vertices when he opts into the matching mechanism as when he opts out. We offer a new perspective on this problem by considering an arbitrary graph, but assuming that vertices are associated with players at random. Our main result asserts that, under certain conditions, any fixed optimal matching is likely to be individually rational up to lower-order terms. We will discuss the implications of our results for market design in general, and kidney exchange in particular. This is a joint project with my brother Ariel Procaccia and his group in the Carnegie Mellon CS department. Since I myself am a layman in all the non mathematical aspects of the project, I expect the talk to be very accessible.