## **CHAPTER 9 – VOTING**

<u>Plurality Method</u>: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the most votes is the winner.

<u>Majority Rule:</u> Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the majority of the votes wins.

When there are *n* votes, the majority is  $\frac{n}{2}+1$  [*n* even] or  $\frac{n+1}{2}$  [*n* odd]

**Borda Count**: Each voter ranks the n candidates with n points assigned to the first choice, n–1 to the second choice and so on. The candidate with the most points wins.

<u>Hare Method</u>: If there is no majority winner, then the candidate with the fewest number of first place votes is eliminated. The election is held again and if no majority winner is found, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated and the election held again. Repeat until a majority winner is found.

<u>Pairwise Comparison Method</u>: Each voter ranks the candidates. Each candidate is compared to each of the other candidates and the candidate who is preferred gets one point. The candidate with the most points wins.

<u>Tournament Method</u>: Compare the entire slate of candidates two at a time, in a pre-determined order. The candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the winner goes on to compare with the third candidate. These pairwise comparisons continue until a winner is found.

<u>Approval Method</u>: Each voter votes for all the candidates they approve of. The candidate with the most votes wins.

## FAIRNESS CRITERIA:

• **Majority**: If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, then that candidate should be declared the winner.

- **Condorcet**: If a candidate is favored when compared one-on-one with every other candidate, then that candidate should be declared the winner.
- Monotonicity: A candidate who wins a first election and then gains additional support without losing any of the original support should also win a second election.
- Irrelevant Alternatives: If a candidate is declared the winner of an election and in a second election one or more of the candidates is removed, then the previous winner should still be declared the winner.

Note that there may be a tie. With two candidates and an even number of votes, it is possible that each received n/2 votes. The method to break the tie should be in place before the election!

Ways to break a tie:

Flip a coin

Use the number of first place votes.

Introduce a new voter [the Senate uses the VP].

(e) Comment on your results winner may change depending on Voting method

A set of 9 voters had the following preference list for 4 candidates:

A set of 9 voters in	A set of 9 voters had the following preference list for 4 candidates:						
		./					
Choices ADCB	ABCD	BCDA	BCAD	CBDA	CDBA	DCBA	
# votes 3	1	1	1	1	1	1	
90	rotes So	we need in	ione than 3	2 = 4.5 vot	es for major	ity	
(a) Who is the ma	jority wir	nner? If the	nere is no	majority,	find the p	olurality	
winner.	B=	1+1	0 -	:/+/	) =	/	
A=3+1	0	2		2	<i>D</i> =	/ /	
= 4	- 0/	2	1	×	/		
(b) Find the Bords	a count w	inner.	34.	AND I	424.1	= /2/4/	
	+ 0		(1)	2 + (	[+ + +))·	1 = 22	
B ((+1) -4	t (17/	).3	(171)	.2 + (	3) 1	= 21	
C (171).4	t (+1	+1).3 +	(3+1)		0.1	= 25 Cwins	
$p (1)^{2} \cdot 4$			(171)	2 + (	(1+1)·1 :	22	
(c) Find the winner	er using th	ne Hare m	ethod.	Elim B+1	redistribute		
A = 4	Elimbel	redistribute =	4	20 1 22.1	2	4	
X = 2		=	2 \$	20		2 7	
	+1	5	3 +	2	=5	A Chins	
		5	till no				
From 121 place votes		1	hajority				
(d) Find the winner	er using tl	ne tournar				CD	
A vs B	à	B vs	C	ecitial pain	C Vs	0	
3+1 1+1+1+1	+1 /	1,1,1	241,111		1.1.1	3+1	
4 5		1+1+1	3+1+1+1	- ( 1	+1+1+1	<i>311</i>	
Bwins to face		3 Vs	6		5 VS	4	
(e) Comment on y	our resul	ts	Ewins to Face 1	$\rho$	- wins	3	
Winner may change		9	Part 6		CWIN	61	

Seventeen board members vote on four candidates, A, B, C, or D, for a new position on their board. Their preference schedules are shown below.

Choices	<b>BCD</b>	DABC	CBDA
# votes	7	6	4

Choices BCD DABC CBDA we need more than  $\frac{17}{2} = 8.5$  # votes 7 6 4 =17 votes votes towin majority we need 9 votes to win majority we need 9 votes to win majority

1 - 0 Wts

$$A = 7$$
 elim  $E = 7$ 
 $X = 0$ 
 $X = 4$ 
 $D = 6$ 
 $X = 4$ 
 $X = 10$ 
 $X$ 

(b) Using the Hare method according to the preference schedules shown, what happens if A rejects the offer before the ranking?

$$B = 7 + 4 = 11$$

$$X = 4$$

$$D = 6$$

$$E \text{ (im C + redistribut of a substitution of a s$$

(c) Comment on your results.

Hare method can violate the irrelevant alternatives
Fairness Criteria

Consider the following preference table:

					1-0/3	
Choices	ABC	BCA	CBA		B= 218	
# votes	3	2	2	= 7 votes	C=1 pt	Bwins
				Pairwise	ConDarison	

Which candidate, if any, is the Condorcet winner?

An election has 13 voters and their preferences are given in the table:

				ABC
Choices	ABC	CBA	BCA	BAC
# votes	5	4	3	1

We need work that we need 7 or majority.

We need 7 or majority.

Majority

(a) Determine the winner using the Hare method.

$$A = 5 = 5$$

$$B = 3+1 = 4$$

$$C = 4$$

$$= 4$$
how to break tie?

(b) Determine the winner using the Hare method if the last voter changes

their preference from BAC to ABC  

$$A = 5 + 1 = 6$$
 = 6  
 $E = 3$  = 3  
 $C = 4 = 4 + 3$  = 7

(c) Comment on your results.

## SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS FROM CHAPTER 9

1. Use the chart below to determine what kind of poker will be played if each player marks all the games he approves of and the approval method is used to determine the winner.

7 card Stud Game played is 5 card draw X X X 5 card stud X X X X 7 card stud X X X X X Texas hold 'em X X X X Omaha hold 'em X

2. Use the chart below to determine who which two people will be elected to represent a class of 45 students to meet with the professor.

								V45 voters
	12	4	9	6	1	7	6	
Jeanetta	X			X			X	12+6+6 = 24
Mittie		X	X	X			X	4+9+6+6=25
Wilton	X		X		X		X	12+9+1+6=25
Jamaal	X	Х						12+4 = 16
Yong		X	X			X		4+9+7 = 20

People chosen are wilten and Mittie


Votes

3. Suppose that a nine-member committee needs to elect one of the four alternatives A, B, C, or D. Their preference schedule is shown below.

Choices	ABCD	BDAC	CDAB	
# votes	4	3	2	9

(a)	Who wins	using the Borda	a count?	6/c 0	lonih	are a breaker
	$(A) A \qquad (A) $	B) B (C) C 24.3	(D) D (E) No	winner 4 4 . /	=	Total
1	( <del>4</del> ) · 4		+ (3+2) 2			26
		+ (4) - 3		+ (2) 1	=	26
			+ (4)2		_	19
C	(2).4	(212)-3	1 (100	, (), (	2	
0		+ (3+2)-3			_	V /

(b) Who wins if a tournament is held with the ordering ABCD?



(c) Who wins using the Hare method?

(A) A) (B) B (C) C (D) D (E) No winner

$$A = 4$$
 $B = 3$ 
 $A = 4$ 
 $A =$ 

4. There are 4 voters for 3 candidates. Their preference schedule is BCA 4 votes, so we need more than

CBA

Majority is 3 shown below.

			BCA	
Choices	ABC	BCA	CBA	
# votes	2.	1	1	

(a) Determine the winner using the Hare method.

$$A = 2$$
 $B = 1$ 
 $C = 1$ 

Determine the pairwise winner.

A 15	B	Aus	C
2	1+1	2	1+/
2	2	2	2
Tie		Tie	
tie t ea	ch	幸 りた	each

(d) Determine the winner with the Hare method if the voter who liked the order CBA changes to BCA.

$$A = 2 = 2$$
 AdB tie  
 $B = 1 + 1 = 2$   
 $C = = 0$ 

5. The results of an election are

(ABCD)

(ABDC) (CDAB) (CDBA)

(DACB)

10

9

(a) Who is the majority winner? If there is no majority winner, use the

Hare method to determine the winner.

No majority

(A) A (B) B

(C) C (D) D Elim O+ redistribute

(E) No winner

= 25 A Awins using

A=10+9 = 19

= 15

(b) Who is the Borda count winner?

(A) A) (B) B (C) C

(D) D (E) No winner + 34.2 + 44./ = rota/

+(7) 11 = 117 A Awis

+ (10+9)3 + (7)12

x (8 +6) 1 = 85

1(10+6).2

1 (9) 1

(6) .4 + (8+7).3

(c) Who is the pairwise comparison winner?

(A) A

(B) B

(C) C

(D) D ((E) No winner

8+7+6

0+8+7

(d) Determine the winner in the following three tournaments. Note that ABCD means that A plays B and the winner advances to play C. The winner of that second contest plays D to determine the winner of the tournament.

(i) 
$$\overrightarrow{ABCD}$$
. Winner is  $\overrightarrow{D}$ 

$$A \lor B = A$$

$$A \lor C = A$$

$$A \lor O = O$$

(ii) DABC. Winner is 
$$C$$
  $Ov B = O$   $Ov C = C$ 

(iii) BDCA. Winner is 
$$A$$
 $B \times 0 = 0$ 
 $D \times C = C$ 
 $C \times A = A$ 

(e) Comment on your results.